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Racionalidad limitada
Autores:
Coralio Ballester Pla, Penélope Hernández Rojas
Localización:
Revista internacional de sociología
,
ISSN
0034-9712,
Vol. 70, Nº. Extra 1, 2012
,
págs.
27-38
Idioma:
español
DOI
:
10.3989/ris.2011.10.20
Enlaces
Texto completo
Referencias bibliográficas
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