Acceso usuarios
Chris Stephen
The field of international criminal law (ICL) is synonymous with the crowded courtroom and the infamous individual in the dock; Adolf Eichmann, Slobodan Milo�evic', Saddam Hussein, and now Radovan Karad�ic'. The actions of such individuals have taken place within the various conflicts and mass atrocities that have proven to be lamentably frequent both during the last century and now into this one. In the aftermath of this sustained bloodshed, trials, whether national (Klaus Barbie in France, John Demjanjuk in Germany) or international (Jean Kambanda before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)), have constituted a frequent (David Scheffer's pronouncement of �tribunal fatigue� suggests perhaps too frequent) reflex reaction by states and have formed the backbone of ICL. Beginning with the Leipzig trials, then via Nuremberg and Tokyo, Yugoslavia and Rwanda to the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), successive tribunals have sought to build upon the strengths (and weaknesses) of their predecessors. For example, the recent rise of hybrid courts such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) can be attributed, at least in large part, to the flaws of previous international judicial institutions; a perceived lack of legitimacy, huge running costs, and detachment from victims, communities, and the locus delicti. The evolution of ICL thus proceeds through a series of trials and error.
Yet this gradual refinement process has been concerned with form rather than substance. It is to questions such as the location of trials, financial budgeting, and the composition and nationality of judges within these institutions that an abundance of academic commentary has been dedicated. Equally, there has been no shortage of ink devoted to questioning the theoretical rationales put forward for international criminal justice and highlighting the limits of the logic underpinning that reasoning
