Acceso usuarios
Ian S. Forrester, Jacquelyn F. MacLennan, Anthony Dawes
The years 2007 to 2009 have been a period of significant activity by the European Commission, in terms of both decisions and policy guidelines. The aim of the 2004 modernisation reforms was to enable the Commission to refocus its work to deal with the most serious competition law infringements. Renouncing its monopoly over the grant of exemptions led to a great expansion of national competition law effort. Cooperation between competition authorities in Europe and around the world has increased. The Commission is not just first among equals in Europe; it is arguably achieving a higher public profile for its enforcement initiatives than any other agency in the world.
The Commission concentrated its priorities in this period in the following main areas.
First, it conducted a number of sector inquiries, most prominently in the energy and pharmaceuticals sectors. 1 Second, it published a White Paper on damages actions for antitrust violations, aimed at encouraging the emergence of a climate of private enforcement in Europe. As expected, this provoked substantial interest and comment.
Third, it pursued its tough stance on cartels, and accompanied this with a new cartel settlement procedure. This initiative is, in a sense, the result of the Commission becoming a victim of the success of its leniency programme, and aims to encourage companies to accelerate the disposition of cases in return for a small financial discount.
Fourth, in focusing its efforts on cartel cases and in other major cases under Article 82 EC, in particular Intel, the fines imposed by the Commission have become astonishingly high. Indeed, the levels set can exceed financial penalties anywhere in the world for any offence. This severity of fining policy has drawn attention to the Commission's own procedural weaknesses, as well as demanding rigorous judicial oversight. Unfortunately, the worldwide reputation of the European �
