Competencia e incentivos a la cooperación en la interacción de grupos de interés que pretenden aumentar su influencia política directa: ¿cuál es la importancia de la presión política?

• Autores: Antonio Javier Prado-Domínguez , Antonio García Lorenzo
• Localización: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, ISSN 0210-1173, Nº 192, 2010, págs. 105-128
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • En este trabajo se estudian las interacciones GIDI-gobierno mediante la presión política, en un contexto de relación de agencia y presencia de información relevante. En concreto, se examinan esas interacciones cuando la relación de agencia se produce con información simétrica y se construye un modelo para investigar las interacciones GIDI-gobierno en un entorno de relación de agencia e información asimétrica donde los grupos pueden actuar de manera competitiva o cooperativa. El modelo señala que la utilidad esperada por el gobierno es mayor cuando los GIDI actúan cooperativamente, pues dicha utilidad cuando los GIDI presionan independientemente se limita exclusivamente a la de reserva. La cooperación genera un tipo de relaciones basadas en la credibilidad que beneficia al gobierno y a los GIDI, razón por la cual éstas tenderán a consolidarse.

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