The International Court of Justice's decision on the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) has exposed the unforeseen irony in the international consensus on the singular distinction of genocide as the crime of crimes. Defying expectations, this classification coupled with the conception of a �civil genocide� has magically transformed into a legal shield which protects states from responsibility even as individual convictions are being handed down. Yet, the history of the Genocide Convention easily recalls the objective of preventing the commission of genocide by states and individuals alike. This article thus ponders on the virtue of seeking recourse under the Genocide Convention � whether against the state or the individual. In traversing this inquiry, it embarks on a comparative analysis of selected case law from the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, and the International Court of Justice. As it uncovers a counterintuitive clash of jurisprudential outcome and a widening gap between the ideal and the real, the article identifies the legal bolts which need to be adjusted so that the genocide stops can be pulled in the right direction.
