La economía política de la supervivencia de los dictadores

• Autores: Abel Escribà Folch
• Localización: Revista española de ciencia política, ISSN 1575-6548, Nº 16, 2007, págs. 109-132
• Idioma: español
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The political economy of dictators' survival
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • Este trabajo explora qué factores explican la supervivencia de los dictadores en el poder centrándo- se en las estrategias de compra de lealtad. Se muestra así que los dictadores que son capaces de incorporar en las estructuras del régimen a aquellos que necesita para estabilizar su cargo y a la oposición potencial permanecen mayor tiempo en el poder. Para lograrlo, los gobernantes autorita- rios recurren a la distribución de rentas y, en caso de que sectores más amplios deban ser cooptados, a creación de instituciones. Se muestra, además, cómo diferentes grupos tienen distintas utilidades opreferencias respecto a qué bienes pueden comprar su lealtad. Para evitar ser derrocado por lapropia elite, es crucial repartir rentas procedentes de la exportación de materias primas. Las ins- tituciones dictatoriales ayudan a prevenir intervenciones militares y de la propia elite, mientras que los cambios derivados de movimientos populares pueden ser evitados mediante bienes públicos como el crecimiento económico.

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