CORPORATE CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
págs. 463-471
PRECOMMITMENT AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES
págs. 473-522
CORPORATE POLICY AND THE COHERENCE OF DELAWARE TAKEOVER LAW
págs. 523-575
UNREGULABLE DEFENSES AND THE PERILS OF SHAREHOLDER CHOICE
págs. 577-666
THE SHAREHOLDER AS ULYSSES: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON WHY INVESTORS IN PUBLIC CORPORATIONS TOLERATE BOARD GOVERNANCE
págs. 667-712
WHY FIRMS ADOPT ANTITAKEOVER ARRANGEMENTS
págs. 714-753
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ANTITAKEOVER PROTECTION AT THE IPO STAGE
págs. 755-784
CONTROLLING CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
págs. 785-843
APPRAISING THE NONEXISTENT: THE DELAWARE COURTS STRUGGLE WITH CONTROL PREMIUMS
págs. 845-880
PREMIUMS IN STOCK-FOR-STOCK MERGERS AND SOME CONSEQUENCES IN THE LAW OF DIRECTOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES
págs. 881-915
CREDITORS' BALL: THE "NEW" NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHAPTER 11
págs. 917-951
THE NEW FEDERALISM OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM: PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS OF TWO RESIDENTS ON ONE SMALL STATE
págs. 953-1005
MUSINGS ON THE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES, DIRECTOR LIABILITY CONCERNS, CORPORATE CONTROL TRANSACTIONS, ETHICS, AND FEDERALISM
págs. 1007-1021
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