The value of testimonial-based beliefs in the face of AI-generated quasi-testimony

• Álvarez, Felipe ^[1] ; Espinosa, Ruth ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad Andrés Bello

     Universidad Andrés Bello

     Santiago, Chile

     
• Localización: Aufklärung: revista de filosofia, ISSN-e 2318-9428, Vol. 11, Nº. Extra 0, 2024 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Filosofia e Literatura), págs. 25-38
• Idioma: portugués
• DOI: 10.18012/arf.v11iEspecial.70023
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The El valor de las creencias testimoniales ante los quasi-testimonios producidos por IA generativa
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • português

    The value of testimony as a source of knowledge has been a subject of epistemological debates. The "trust theory of testimony" suggests that human testimony is based on an affective relationship supported by social norms. However, the advent of generative artificial intelligence challenges our understanding of genuine testimony. The concept of "quasi-testimony" seeks to characterize utterances produced by non-human entities that mimic testimony but lack certain fundamental attributes. This article analyzes these issues in depth, exploring philosophical perspectives on testimony and the implications of conversational AI technologies on our epistemic practices.

  • English

    El valor del testimonio como fuente de conocimiento ha sido sujeto de debates epistemológicos. La “trust theory of testimony”, por ejemplo, sugiere que el testimonio humano se basa en una relación afectiva fundada en las normas sociales. Sin embargo, el surgimiento de la inteligencia artificial generativa desafía nuestro entendimiento del testimonio genuino. Así, el concepto de “quasi-testimonio” busca caracterizar las afirmaciones realizadas por entidades no-humanas que imitan el testimonio, pero que carecen de ciertos atributos fundamentales. Este artículo analiza ese problema en profundidad, explorando las perspectivas filosóficas en torno al testimonio y las implicaciones de las tecnologías de IA conversacionales en nuestras practicas epistémicas.

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