Respect and Struggles for Recognition: Kant and Honneth

• Autores: Selda Salman
• Localización: Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, ISSN-e 2386-7655, Vol. 20, 2024, págs. 31-40
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.5209/kant.95647
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Respeto y lucha por el reconocimiento: Kant y Honneth
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• Resumen
  • español

    Filósofos y estudiosos a menudo pasan por alto la fundacional contribución de Kant al concepto de reconocimiento, pero resulta difícil desarrollar una teoría exhaustiva sin integrar la filosofía moral kantiana, en particular su conceptualización del respeto. Al respecto, me baso en las ideas del filósofo contemporáneo Axel Honneth, quien reconoce ambivalentemente la influencia de la filosofía moral de Kant en la configuración de la conceptualización de la lucha por el reconocimiento. A diferencia de Honneth, afirmo inequívocamente que cualquier teoría de la lucha por el reconocimiento necesita fundamentos kantianos explícitos.

  • English

    Philosophers and scholars often overlook Kant’s foundational contribution to the concept of recognition (Anerkennung), yet it proves challenging to develop a comprehensive theory without integrating Kantian moral philosophy, particularly his conceptualization of respect. I contend that the demand for recognition necessitates a Kantian moral perspective, which revolves around the feeling of respect. In this regard, I draw upon the insights of contemporary philosopher Axel Honneth, who acknowledges the influence of Kant’s moral philosophy in shaping the conceptualization of the struggle for recognition.

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