Two Senses of ‘Essence’ and a Straw Man

• Teresa Robertson Ishii ^[1]
  1. [1] University of California System

     University of California System

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 56, Nº. 168, 2024, págs. 3-27
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1568
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    En este trabajo distingo dos sentidos de la palabra “esencia”, los cualesfiguran prominentemente en la metafísica analítica reciente. Para desambiguar, adop-to la terminología de “esencia modal” (paracómouna cosadebe sermetafísicamente)y “esencia qué-idad” (paraqué esuna cosa). Con la ayuda de esta terminología, meocupo de la objeción de Kit Fine de que la metafísica modal en el marco deElnombrar y la necesidadde Saul Kripke ofrece un análisis conceptual incorrectode la esencia qué-idad. Muestro que la objeción es infundada, y así, que no hayninguna justificación para el veredicto de Fine de que la concepción kripkeana de lametafísica debe ser abandonada.

  • English

    In this paper, I distinguish two senses of the word ‘essence’ both of which figure prominently in recent analytic metaphysics. To disambiguate, I adopt the terminology of ‘modal essence’ (for how a thing metaphysically must be) and ‘whatness essence’ (for what a thing is). With the help of this terminology, I address Kit Fine’s charge that modal metaphysics in the framework of Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity proffers an incorrect conceptual analysis of whatness essence. I show that the charge is baseless, and thus that there is no justification for Fine’s verdict that the Kripkean conception of metaphysics should be given up.

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