Mercados vs. mecanismos e os seus impactos sobre os servizos de saúde

• David Cantala ^[1] ; Grisel Ayllón Aragón ^[2]
  1. [1] College of Mexico

     College of Mexico

     México

     
  2. [2] Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey

     Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey

     México

     
• Localización: Revista galega de economía: Publicación Interdisciplinar da Facultade de Ciencias Económicas e Empresariais, ISSN-e 2255-5951, ISSN 1132-2799, Vol. 33, Nº. 3, 2024, págs. 184-212
• Idioma: gallego
• DOI: 10.15304/rge.33.3.9472
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Markets vs mechanisms and its respective impacts on healthcare system
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Los mecanismos de asignación en uso en los mercados de médicos internistas heredaron de la teoría del emparejamiento, de la cual presentamos una breve introducción, de propriedades normativas atractivas, en particular permite proveer un mayor bienestar a los médicos e implementar asignaciones de internos a hospitales estables. Contrastamos las ventajas y desventajas teóricas de un mercado centralizado respecto a uno descentralizado bajo la óptica de la propiedad de emparejamiento por tipos similares.

  • galego

    Os mecanismos de asignación en uso nos mercados de médicos internistas herdaron da teoría do emparellamento, da cal presentamos unha breve introdución, propiedades normativas atractivas;

    en particular permiten prover un maior benestar aos médicos e aplicar asignacións de internos a hospitais estables. Contrastamos as vantaxes e desvantaxes teóricas dun mercado centralizado respecto dun descentralizado, baixo a óptica da propiedade de emparellamento por tipos similares.

  • English

    Real life mechanisms used to assign doctors to hospitals inherit properties from matching theory, it enhances the welfare of interns and allows to implement interns to hospital in a stable way. We briefly review matching theory, then discuss the advantages and drawbacks of these centralized markets vs decentralized ones using the property of assortative matchings as main analytical tool.

• Referencias bibliográficas
  • Abdulkadiroğlu, A, Pathak P.A., Alvin E. Roth A.E., & Sönmez T. (2005). The Boston Public School Match. American Economic Review, 95(2),...
  • Abdulkaderoğlu, A. & Sönmez, T. (2003). School Choice: a Mechanism Design Approach. American Economic Review, 93(3), 729-747. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061
  • Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S. (1994). Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems, Economic...
  • Alkan, A., (1998). Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings, Mathematical Social Sciences, 16, 207-209.
  • Anderson A. & Smith L. (2024) “The comparative statics of Sorting”, American Economic Review, 114(3), 709-51. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210890
  • Becker, G. (1973). A theory of marriage: Part I. Journal of Political Economy, 81, 813-846. https://doi.org/10.1086/260084
  • Bloch, F., Cantala, D. & Gibaja, D. (2020). "Matching through institutions", Games and Economic Behavior, 121, 204-231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.010
  • Calsamiglia, C., Haeringer, G. & Klijn, F., (2010). "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study". American Economic Review,...
  • Massó, J. (2010). El intercambio de riñones y la Matemática Discreta, Paseo por la Geometría 2009-2020, Facultad de Ciencias de la Universidad...
  • Damiano, E., Li, H. & Wing, S. (2005). Unravelling of dynamic sorting. Review of Economic Studies, 72, 1057–1076. https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00361
  • Dubins, L. & Freedman, D. (1981), Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm. American Mathematics Monthly, 88, 485-494. https://doi.org/10.2307/2321753
  • Dutta, B. & Massó, J. (1997). Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues. Journal of Economic Theory, 75,...
  • Echenique, F. & Pereyra, J.S. (2016). Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets. Theoretical Economics, 11, 1–39....
  • Ehelers, L. (2004) In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm, Games and Economic...
  • Ergin H. & Sönmez T. (2006). Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism. Journal of Public Economics, 90(1-2), 215-237. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002
  • Fréchette, G. R., Roth, A.E., Ünver, M.U. (2007). Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: Evidence from post-season college football bowls....
  • Gale, D. & Shapley, L. (1962). College Admissions and Stability of Marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15. https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827
  • Hałaburda, H. (2010). Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 69, 365–393. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.00
  • Li, H. & Rosen, S. (1998). Unraveling in matching markets. American Economic Review, 88, 371–387. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1831
  • Li, H. & Suen, W. (2000). Risk sharing, sorting, and early contracting. Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1058–1091. https://doi.org/10.1086/317675
  • Li, H., Suen, W. (2004). Self-fulfilling early-contracting rush. International Economic Review, 45, 301–324. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00127.x
  • Hatfield, J. W. & Milgrom, P. R. (2005). Matching with Contracts. American Economic Review, 95(4): 913-935. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466
  • El Médico Interactivo (2022) Los médicos jóvenes alertan de una fuga masiva de cerebros. El Médico Interactivo. https://elmedicointeractivo.com/fuga-masiva-de-cerebros-medicos-jovenes/
  • Kagel, J.H. & Roth, A.E. (2000). The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment....
  • Kamada, Y. & Kojima, F. (2020). Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints. The Japanese Economic Review, 71(1),...
  • Kelso, A.S. & Crawford V.P. (1982). Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes. Econometrica, 50, 1483-1504. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913392
  • Kesten, O. (2010). School Choice with Consent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125, 1297– 1348. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297
  • Klijn, F. & Yazici, A. (2014). A many-to-one rural hospital theorem. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 54, 63-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.09.003
  • Knuth, D.E. (1976). Mariages Stables et leurs relations avec d’autres problèmes combinatoires. Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal
  • Kojima, F. & Pathak P.A. (2009) “Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets”, American Economic Review, 99(3), 608-627....
  • Linde, P. (2019). Los 100 hospitales mejor valorados de España. El País. https://elpais.com/sociedad/2019/11/26/actualidad/1574781095_926910.html
  • Nicolò, A., Sen, A. & Yadav, S. (2019) “Matching with partners and Projects” Journal of Economic Theory, 184, 104942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104942
  • Niederle, M., Roth A.E. & Ünver, M.U. (2013). Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply: An experimental investigation. Games,...
  • Nguyen, T. & Vohra, R., (2018), Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples, American Economic Review, 108, 11, 3154-69. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141188
  • Pereyra, J.S. (2013). A Dynamic School Choice Model. Games and Economic Behavior, 80, 100-114. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.011
  • Romero-Medina, A. & Triossi, M. (2023) Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets. Economic Theory, 75, 591–623. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01417-5
  • Roth, A.E. (1982). The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research, 7, 617-628. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.4.617
  • Roth, A.E. (1984). The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory. Journal of Political...
  • Roth, A. E., (1991). A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons...
  • Roth, A.E. & Parenson, E. (1999). The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design....
  • Roth, A.E. & Oliveira Sotomayor, M. (1990). Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game Theoretical Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University...
  • Songzi, D. & Livne, Y (2014). Rigidity of transfers and unraveling in matching markets. Unpublished paper.
  • Sönmez T. (1997) “Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets”, Journal of Economic Theory, 77, 1, 197-204. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2316
  • Sotomayor, M.O. (1996). Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages. Games and Economic Behavior, 13(1), 135-137....
  • Troyan, P., Delacrétaz, D. & Kloosterman, A. (2020). Essentially Stable Matchings. Games and Economic Behavior, 120, 370–390. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.009
  • Wetz, R.V., Seelig C.B., Khoueiry, G. & Weiserbs, K.F. (2010). Out of match residency offers: The possible extent and implications of...