Los límites del yo: hacia una clarificación de la relación entre delirios de inserción de pensamiento y el principio de inmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación

• Pablo López-Silva ^[1] ; Emmanuel Méndez ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidad de Valparaíso

     Universidad de Valparaíso

     Valparaíso, Chile

     
  2. [2] Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

     Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

     Santiago, Chile

     
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 56, Nº. 167, 2024, págs. 157-177
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1537
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Este artículo examina el debate acerca de si el delirio de inserción depensamiento constituye un contraejemplo para el denominadoprincipio de inmu-nidad al error a través de la mala identificación. Luego de distinguir diferentesformulaciones del principio en la literatura, concluimos que el fenómeno deliranteen cuestión no constituye un contraejemplo para el principio examinado. En la partefinal se clarifica el concepto de autoadscripción psicológica y su uso relativo a lospronombres de primera persona en el contexto del debate acerca de la relación entreinserción de pensamiento einmunidad al error a través de la mala identificación

  • English

    This paper examines the debate about whether delusions of thought insertion constitute a counterexample against the so-called principle of immunity to error through misidentification. After distinguishing different formulations of the principle in the literature, we claim that the aforementioned delusional phenomena does not undermine the target principle. Finally, we clarify the concept of psychological self-adscription in its use relative to first-person pronouns in the context of the debate about the relationship between thought insertion and immunity to error through misidentification.

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