María Nohelia Parra
El Indo-Pacífico ha evolucionado hasta convertirse en una estrategia indispensable para el bloque liberal-democrático de los países que circundan ambos océanos. Este artículo propone revisar aspectos fundamentales que permitan comprender el rol de Japón en el desarrollo del Indo-Pacífico como proyecto geoestratégico en el contexto de Asia-Pacífico. El primer aspecto analiza la evolución histórica del Indo-Pacífico desde que fue propuesto en 2007 por India y Japón como un diálogo de cooperación que permitiera la libre navegación en ambos océanos, hasta convertirse en una estrategia institucionalizada en documentos de política exterior de países con poder alto y medio en esta región. También se han revisado diferentes definiciones del Indo-Pacífico propuestas por distintos expertos en el área, que han discutido y razonado sobre las características, principios y valores comunes que sirven para reflexionar de manera más amplia sobre el alcance y los objetivos fundamentales del concepto. El segundo elemento abre el debate sobre el rol de Japón en el Indo-Pacífico, al centrarse en el estudio del entorno de seguridad inmediato a Japón y cómo este ha impactado su postura de seguridad y las determinaciones de su agenda del “Indo-Pacífico Libre y Abierto” o FOIP. De igual forma, se analiza el carácter defensivo de la FOIP a través de las premisas centrales del realismo defensivo, que sirven para entender las motivaciones y metas estratégicas de Japón dirigidas a la consolidación de una región geoestratégica que permita establecer un entorno de confianza y cooperación minilateral y multilateral.
La sección principal del artículo analiza el tercer elemento propuesto, cuyo objetivo es comprender el rol que Japón ha tenido en los mecanismos políticos establecidos para el Indo-Pacífico por naciones que pertenecen a Asia-Pacífico, entre ellas Australia, Corea del Sur y algunos miembros de la ASEAN; estos tres actores, por su ubicación geográfica y valor político agregado, resultan indispensables para la construcción de un concepto sólido y perdurable. Se han revisado los mecanismos de cooperación, principalmente en materia de seguridad, en los que Japón ha participado con todos ellos; lo que ha permitido alcanzar conclusiones sobre cuál es la influencia que el país ha tenido en el establecimiento de documentos estratégicos dirigidos al Indo-Pacífico, sus particularidades y hasta dónde los diálogos de cooperación establecidos pueden contribuir a la construcción de un nuevo orden regional que pueda institucionalizarse de manera sólida y perdurable. Al final, se han propuesto algunas reflexiones sobre cuáles deberían ser los movimientos políticos futuros de Japón y qué desafíos podría enfrentar para fortalecer al Indo-Pacífico en una región dividida ideológicamente y supeditada a un delicado equilibrio de poder, impuesto por el revisionismo y expansionismo de sus vecinos próximos.
The Indo-Pacific has evolved to become an essential strategy for the liberal-democratic bloc encompassing nations from both oceans. This article aims to review fundamental aspects that allow us to comprehend the role Japan has assumed in the development of the Indo-Pacific as a geostrategic project in the Asian-Pacific context. To achieve its main objective, this paper has been divided into three sections, in which historical, theoretical, strategic, and foreign policy issues are addressed.The article summarizes the historical path of the Indo-Pacific since it was proposed in 2007 by the Indian official Gurpreet Khurana in his article Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation and by the former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his Speech The Confluence of the Two Seas given in the Indian Parliament. Both of them proposed a cooperation dialogue between the two nations to guarantee the freedom of navigation that was threatened by Chinese expansionism at that time, until its transformation in an institutionalized strategy that is part of official foreign policy documents established by hegemonic and mid-power countries. Different definitions of the Indo-Pacific have also been studied, which allows us to reflect on the features, principles, and common values which are encompassed more broadly by the scope and central objectives of the concept. The Indo-Pacific can be understood as a social construct that reflects the economic, political, and security dynamics of the countries that surround the Indian and Pacific Ocean. Moreover, one of the most significant definitions reported on the Indo-Pacific highlights the fact that it is now a concept with a set of specific rules and norms that gives geography a political meaning and which ultimately will allow countries to build up a new regional order based on freedom, peace, and a defensive security approach.The second section opens the debate on the role of Japan in the Indo-Pacific strategy, which focuses on analyzing the security context of the country and how it affects its security stance and the characteristics and determinations of its Indo-Pacific agenda. In the geopolitical context, there is a direct link between the threatening environment posed by China, Russia, and North Korea and the security stance that Japan has taken in recent years. Furthermore, within this environment, the FOIP strategy has a more meaningful place since it allows Japan to complement its national security architecture by establishing different cooperation mechanisms that go beyond the security agreement with the US. The basis of all of these integration mechanisms is the defensive feature that all of them share; for Japan it is important to strengthen military dialogues that do not aim to represent a menace to other countries, and continue to pursue the defensive approach of both its national security framework and the nature of all the cooperation dialogues it is part of.This section also analyzes the most significant premises proposed by a defensive realism that serves to understand the characteristics and motivations behind the FOIP agenda. Stephen Walt’s proposition was fundamental. According to this theorist, states create alignment only if they perceive a menace from a specific powerful country, and they evaluate it in terms of the aggregated power, geographical proximity, offensive military capabilities, and intentions to attack. On this, it can be argued that Japan has perceived threats from the aforementioned countries, mostly in terms of their proximity, offensive military capabilities, and willingness to attack. Thus, it has taken a rational political decision to nurture a strategic agenda whose main purpose is to decrease the level of uncertainty in terms of security, without addressing a military approach that can worsen the environment since, ultimately, a defensive security nature does not look to maximize physical capabilities, but strategic cooperation as a dissuasive element.The last and most important part of the text evaluates the role that Japan has had in the implementation of the political mechanisms on the Indo-Pacific in the Asian-Pacific zone. Australia, South Korea, and the ASEAN nations have been part of the analysis since they have a geographical and political centrality in the establishment and success of an enduring and solid new regional order. In this section, a review of the security cooperation mechanisms that Japan has instituted with these three actors has been developed. It allows us to reach punctual conclusions about the level of influence that the country has on the inauguration of strategic documents on the Indo-Pacific, about their characteristics, and the scope that these mechanisms can have in the building of a new regional order that can be institutionalized beyond a way of grouping that is composed of like-minded nations. Australia has been one of the closest countries to Japan in achieving the Indo-Pacific goal. It is part of the QUAD, and was the second country, after Japan, to establish an official strategy for the concept. Both countries have intensively cooperated within the Indo-Pacific region, but it is not clear if they can reach a formal bilateral agreement that can take their cooperation to a different level. Contrary to the Australian experience, South Korea and Japan have had more challenging relations because of several historical controversies, mainly in relation to their experiences during World War II. It has made cooperation between the two countries complex and unlikely; nevertheless, the threatening context, the role of the American administration, and the willingness of the leaders from both countries have allowed them to cooperate through military mechanisms. Also, South Korea finally agreed to integrate the Indo-Pacific into its foreign policy strategy in 2022, which has been a milestone for the strategic approach of the concept. As ASEAN is a region with a new central position for the Indo-Pacific, Japan is aware of its geographic value and has started to promote constant meetings with the bloc that have ended in joint statements that embrace political commitments toward the Indo-Pacific. The country has also given these nations a significant space in its new security assistance policy (OSA), which might indicate that they have a compelling strategic position for the Indo-Pacific Japanese goals.Japan has a central role in the Indo-Pacific because of its historical, ideational, and strategic position in constructing and preserving the concept. The country has to be very cautious about what political movements are coming and what challenges it may experience in the pursuit of its main goals in a region that is ideologically divided and that is reliant on a weak power balance. This has ultimately been imposed by the revisionism and expansionism of its closest neighboring countries