Acceso usuarios
Armando Santoni
It is well known that whenever a company is likely to become insolvent, there is an increase of the risk of opportunistic conducts to the detriment of corporate creditors. The legal systems worldwide resort to various means to limit this risk. For example, various incentives may be provided to anticipate the early emergence of the crisis, channeling it into dedicated procedures. On the other hand, the liability regime of directors for acts performed in the vicinity of insolvency shall be aggravated. The substantial unity of the problems posed by this subject matter confirms the usefulness of a comparative approach. The present paper analyzes the directors’ duties from different points of view. First, from a teleological standpoint, it analyzises the moment from which directors must take into account the interests of corporate creditors. In the second place, it investigates the content of managerial duties and finally whether directors retain a certain amount of discretion in a situation of crisis or not.
1. Introduzione – 2.1. Analisi comparatistica – 2.2. L’ordinamento statunitense – 2.3. L’ordinamento inglese – 2.4. L’ordinamento tedesco – 2.5. Risultati dell’analisi comparatistica: prime conclusioni – 3.1. Il sistema italiano – 3.2. L’orientamento funzionale dei doveri gestori nella crisi – 3.3. La diligenza e la discrezionalità gestoria – 3.4. Il sindacato giudiziale sull’adeguatezza degli assetti – 4. Conclusioni.
