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The advent of cyberattacks has reinvigorated the decades-old academic debate about the nature and extent of the right to self-defense under international law. The debate has mainly focused on the bilateral relationship of the attacking Stare and the directly targeted victim State. However, the increasingly indiscriminate nature of cyberattacks calls for a legal assessment of the right to self-defense of third States that are incidentally affected by such operations. This article analyses whether the incidental harm of cyberattacks can amount to an «armed attack» forthe purposes of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The discussion centers around the question whether an attacker's intent (animus aggressionis) is needed to qualify the incidental effects as an armed atrack against a third State. Should standards of recklessness or general intent to harm suffice, defensive actions by third States could theoretically be lawful. The author cautions that while self-defense is crucial, its invocation should not trivialize its exceptionality, ensuring it remains a deterrent against malicious cyber activities.
self-defense; use of force; Cyberattack; animus aggressions; third Stares; countermeasures
