A decent proposal

• Autores: Luis C. Corchón Díaz , Carmen Herrero Blanco
• Localización: Spanish economic review, ISSN 1435-5469, Vol. 6, Nº 2, 2004, págs. 107-126
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/s10108-003-0076-9
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • In this paper we explore the notion that players are decent in the sense that their choices are bounded by certain unwritten social rules. We apply this idea to problems of Bankruptcy and Implementation.

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