La perspectiva de la segunda persona: ¿comprensión o interpretación?

• Ángeles Eraña ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

     Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

     México

     
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 55, Nº. 165, 2023, págs. 71-91
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1467
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Referencias bibliográficas
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