Acceso usuarios
Héctor Olásolo Alonso 
, Federico Freydell Mesa
Las tensiones que ocurrieron en la década de 2010 entre varios gobiernos africanos y la Corte Penal Internacional llevaron a la creación del Protocolo de Malabo, una entidad internacional propia a la Unión Africana. El presente artículo busca analizar los elementos procesales observados en el Protocolo de Malabo, cómo se parecen o se diferencian a previas entidades internacionales de Derecho Internacional Penal, y que elementos se pueden resaltar con relación a sus vínculos con la Corte Penal Internacional, las entidades nacionales, y la posibilidad de cooperar con estos para reducir la “brecha de impunidad”. Un análisis cuantitativo-interpretativo de las diferentes normas que constituyen el Protocolo permite llegar a la conclusión que esta entidad tiene poderes mucho más limitados que los prometidos por sus naciones ponentes, y que precisaría de un amplio régimen de cooperación con la Corte Penal Internacional, régimen que no existe y no es parte de la raison d’etre de la entidad, para evitar el crecimiento de la impunidad.
Tensions between various African governments and the International Criminal Court led, in the 2010s, to the drafting of the Malabo Protocol, an international entity that would replace it and belong to the African Union. This article seeks to analyze the observed procedural elements of International Criminal Law present in this Protocol. It also seeks to clear out which elements of international cooperation – both with the International Criminal Court and with national governments – exist, in order to reduce the impunity gap in situations of grave international and transnational crimes. A quantitative-interpretative analysis of the different norms that constitute the Protocol lead to an inevitable assessment: the Protocol has very limited Powers regarding cooperation and independent investigation, and requires an ample cooperations regime with the ICC and national jurisdictions to work. Unfortunately, said regime does not exist and goes against the very raison d’etre of the proposed tribunal.
Tensions between various African governments and the International Criminal Court led, in the 2010s, to the drafting of the Malabo Protocol, an international entity that would replace it and belong to the African Union. This article seeks to analyze the observed procedural elements of International Criminal Law present in this Protocol. It also seeks to clear out which elements of international cooperation – both with the International Criminal Court and with national governments – exist, in order to reduce the impunity gap in situations of grave international and transnational crimes. A quantitative-interpretative análisis of the different norms that constitute the Protocol lead to an inevitable assessment: the Protocol has very limited Powers regarding cooperation and independent investigation, and requires an ample cooperations regime with the ICC and national jurisdictions to work. Unfortunately, said regime does not exist and goes against the very raison d’etre of the proposed tribunal.
