Acceso usuarios
Henry Flatt, Nhat-Dang Do
We argue that “analytic” bureaucratic agencies are essential actors in the policy process because of their role acting as both information processing organizations and policy design specialists. Analytic agencies can exert unique influence over lawmaking activities because legislators consider them expert informational sources in a multitude of areas. Rather than assume policy advice falls rigidly into either “political” or “technical” forms of information, we show that an analytic office can produce both types of content. Whereas previous policy process scholarship almost exclusively examines elected officials and federal agencies, this article tests our theory using a state agency, California's Department of Finance (DOF). Our findings demonstrate how the Governor delegates partisan legislative signaling duties and neutral expert budgetary advice to the same trusted analytic personnel. The data include every introduced bill in six recently completed legislative sessions and show how DOF recommendations are strongly associated with bill passage and the Governor's veto.
