Against magnitude realism

• Geoffrey Lee ^[1]
  1. [1] University of California System

     University of California System

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 55, Nº. 163, 2023 (Ejemplar dedicado a: The metaphysics and representation of extensive magnitudes), págs. 13-44
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    En trabajos recientes, Christopher Peacocke ha defendido una especie de realismo (o antirreduccionismo) sobre magnitudes como la temperatura y la distancia espacial. El argumento de Peacocke es que las magnitudes son un compromiso ineliminable de las explicaciones científicas y cotidianas (incluidas las explicaciones de alto nivel), y que son las candidatas naturales para los valores semánticos de nuestro discurso ordinario sobre magnitudes y para los contenidos de nuestros estados mentales. Critico estos argumentos, centrándome en particular en si el realista tiene una explicación satisfactoria de cómo los hechos de magnitud de alto nivel están fundamentados en hechos de más bajo nivel. Argumento que es preferible, o al menos viable, un enfoque menos realista (es decir, más reduccionista).

    También pretendo aclarar sustancialmente lo que está en juego en el debate

  • English

    In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance.

    Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these arguments, in particular focusing on whether the realist has a satisfactory account of how high-level magnitude facts are grounded in lower-level facts. I argue that a less realist (i.e., more reductionist approach) is preferable, or at least viable. I also aim to substantially clarify what is at stake in the debate.

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