Acceso usuarios
Sebastián Vallejo Vera
In democratic politics, the participation of interest groups in policymaking iscommonly understood as a secluded affair. Why would interest groups andpolicymakers make public an otherwise private affair? I argue that legislatorsinvite interest groups to participate in the legislative process to raise thesalience of issues they”own”. Legislators with gatekeeping authority, I show,bring interest groups into committees when their party benefits from raisingpublic attention. Interest groups, on their part, are given preferential accesstofinetune laws that directly affect them. Extensions of the model show thatparticipation increases before an election and declines after, with issuesalience providing electoral benefits rather than policy ones. I test myargument using an original dataset of 4902 instances of interest groupparticipation in committee meetings in the Ecuadorian Congress between1988 and 2018, as well as over 30 interviews to interest grouprepresentatives, legislators, and congressional staff.
