Activismo accionarial y retribución directiva: la influencia del say-on-payen las empresas cotizadas españolas

Gregorio Sánchez Marín; Juan Samuel Baixauli Soler; Gabriel Lozano Reina

Activismo accionarial y retribución directiva: la influencia del say-on-payen las empresas cotizadas españolas

Gregorio Sánchez Marín ^[2] ; Juan Samuel Baixauli Sole ^[1] ; Gabriel Lozano Reina
1. [1] Universidad de Murcia
  
  Universidad de Murcia
  
  Murcia, España
2. [2] Universidad de Alcalá
  
  Universidad de Alcalá
  
  Alcalá de Henares, España
Localización: Revista de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. CEF, ISSN-e 2792-8322, ISSN 2792-8314, Nº. 472, 2023, págs. 217-244
Idioma: español
DOI: 10.51302/rtss.2023.3359
Títulos paralelos:
- Shareholder activism and executive compensation: the influence of say-on-pay on Spanish listed companies
Enlaces
- Texto completo
Resumen
- español
  El say-on-pay (SOP) es una votación realizada en junta general que permite al accionariado pronunciarse –mediante un voto a favor, en contra o una abstención– acerca de la idoneidad de la retribución directiva. Esta votación, implementada originariamente por el Reino Unido en 2002, ha sido acogida en multitud de países, adoptando diversas tipologías. A pesar de las evidencias existentes hasta la fecha, sigue existiendo cierta controversia sobre su efectividad, siendo el contexto español de especial interés por sus especificidades de gobierno corporativo. En este sentido, el objetivo de este trabajo es explorar los efectos del SOP sobre el diseño de la retribución de los CEO de las empresas cotizadas españolas durante el periodo 2013-2020, analizando el grado de activismo existente, así como los efectos de la votación sobre el diseño de los paquetes retributivos. Los resultados indican que el SOP estimula la participación del accionariado en los asuntos de gobierno corporativo relacionados con la retribución, además de fomentar diseños retributivos para los CEO más alineados con los resultados empresariales.
- English
  The say-on-pay (SOP) is a voting held at the annual general meeting that allows shareholders to express their views –by voting in favor, against or by abstaining– on executive compensation. This voting, originally implemented by the United Kingdom in 2002, has been implemented in many countries with different typologies. There is still controversy about the effectiveness of this voting, with the Spanish context being of special interest due to its corporate governance particularities. Based on a sample of Spanish listed companies from 2013 to 2020, the aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of SOP on CEO compensation designs by analyzing the degree of shareholder activism existing as well as the impact of voting results on CEO compensation designs. Our results state that the SOP stimulates the participation of shareholders in corporate governance matters related to pay issues, in addition to encouraging CEO compensation more aligned with firm performance.
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