Acceso usuarios
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Domingo Javier Santana Martín
[1]
Gran Canaria, España
We analyse the impact of voting rights in the hands of the dominant family owner on the presence of women directors in a sample of listed family firms in Spain during 2007–2020. As distinctive features of this paper, we examine whether women directors have or do not have family ties with the dominant family owner, use the control-chain methodology to identify the ultimate or dominant owner of Spanish listed firms and analyse a curvilinear association between family ownership and the appointment of family and non-family female directors in family firms. Drawing on socioemotional, agency and stewardship theories, our results show that when the voting rights of the dominant families are low, they appoint more female directors with family associations. The results also indicate that when family voting rights are high, family founders appoint more non-family women directors to benefit from their industry-specific expertise and objective advice. Overall, our findings suggest that when a certain level of family ownership is reached there is a need to reduce the appointment of women directors with family ties in order to move towards a more balanced and diversified board with a wider representation of skills, knowledge, diverse experiences and talent.
