Acceso usuarios
Madrid, España
El objetivo del artículo es analizar la naturaleza de la conflictividad en la distribución alimentaria en España entre 2014 y 2021. La evidencia empírica la constituyen datos procedentes de registros administrativos tratados con métodos estadísticos (correlación y regresión lineal simple) y econométricos (regresión lineal multivariable). Como resultado, los operadores con mayor poder de negociación en el lado de la demanda, mayoristas e industria transformadora son los que ponderan más en el número de sanciones impuestas, por lo que el análisis resulta confirmatorio de que se ha ejercido poder de mercado en momentos concretos: 1) al formalizar o no contratos, 2) al condicionar el clausulado de los mismos, o 3) en el momento de pagar en plazo lo convenido. La evidencia del análisis podría ser útil para los operadores de la cadena de distribución alimentaria en el momento de establecer sus estrategias comerciales. También para los poderes públicos involucrados en el funcionamiento de los mercados agroalimentarios en el momento de diseñar políticas e incentivos.
The objective of the article is to analyze the nature of conflicts in food distribution in Spain 2014-2021. The empirical evidence is made up of data from administrative records treated with statistical methods (correlation and simple linear regression) and econometric methods (multivariate linear regression). The causal analysis of the conflicts registered in conventional food distribution in Spain between 2014 and 2021 confirms its essentially mercantile nature. Essentially due to the lack of contractual formalization of the commercial relations between the agents that operate in the chain, defects in said formalization or breaches in the due payment terms. If it adds to this the fact that the operators with the greatest bargaining power on the demand side, Wholesalers and Processing Industry, are the ones that weigh more in the number of sanctions imposed, the analysis confirms the presence of flaws in the sense that market power has been exercised in the lapse of time studied. This power has been exercised at specific times: 1) when formalizing contracts or not, 2) when conditioning their clauses, or 3) at the time of paying the agreed term. The evidence shown by the analysis carried out could be useful for the conventional operators of the food distribution chain to establish their commercial strategies. In a particular way for operators that compete with a bigger disadvantage: Producers and Retailers. Also, for the public authorities involved in the fair operation of agri-food markets at the time of designing policies and incentives. The emergence of new niches in the agri-food market, the rise of electronic commerce and the new forms of food distribution linked to platforms (marketplaces) will modify or configure new scenarios of conflict in commercial distribution, whose specific problems and solutions will be susceptible to address for future research.
