Acceso usuarios
Can the freedom of expression be rightfully restricted? If so, how should one distinguish between what may and may not be expressed to others? To answer these questions, I focus on the liberal approach to free speech, introduced by Kant and Stuart Mill, and discuss its main limitations. Based on this analysis, I propose a new normative framework grounded in a critical reassessment of the concept of harm. I argue that this concept must be clarified and expanded so as to cover a wider range of conflicts and that its application must take into account the diversity and the inequality that characterize the public sphere. These conclusions then lead to the identification of the forms of expression that may be legitimately curbed, along with their scope and context. The proposed solution countenances the restriction of expressive acts that contravene the right to one’s privacy, good name and physical or psychological welfare, but rejects the arbitrariness associated with the notions of offence, insult and obscenity. To be legitimate, restrictions must be directed primarily at the discourses or attitudes that might compromise the participation of their targets in the public sphere, and hence the very exercise of their freedom of expression.
