The European Parliament in the Economic and Monetary Union after COVID: towards a slow empowerment?

• Fromage, Diane ^[1] ; Markakis, Menelaos ^[2]
  1. [1] University of Salzburg

     University of Salzburg

     Salzburg, Austria

     
  2. [2] Erasmus University Rotterdam

     Erasmus University Rotterdam

     Países Bajos

     
• Localización: The Journal of legislative studies, ISSN 1357-2334, Vol. 28, Nº. 3, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Parliaments in Times of Crises: Democratic Accountability in the EU Economic Governance from the Euro to the Covid Crisis), págs. 385-401
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1080/13572334.2022.2107811
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • The European Parliament (EP)’s role in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has always been rather limited. Its prerogatives were somewhat reinforced after the Euro crisis, but its role in policy implementation remained minimal. However, because of the pandemic, the level of integration at the supranational level has significantly increased as a result of, among others, the adoption of unique instruments such as the SURE instrument, Next Generation EU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF). This article considers to what extent the EP’s role in EMU has been reinforced as a result of these measures. It finds that the EP was regrettably reserved only a limited role in the operationalisation of the RRF and an even lesser role in other instruments, but that legal and political constraints made any other outcome unlikely. This article argues in favour of an increased use of the existing instruments by both the EP and national parliaments, as well as a reinforcement of interparliamentary cooperation. A far more extensive empowerment of the EP would be required if temporary and exceptional developments that occurred in the EMU during the pandemic were to become more entrenched.

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