Barbari ad portas: la prohibición de la retribución externa como arma defensiva

• Autores: María Isabel Sáez Lacave
• Localización: Indret: Revista para el Análisis del Derecho, ISSN-e 1698-739X, Nº. 3, 2022
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.31009/indret.2022.i3.02
• Enlaces
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• Referencias bibliográficas
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