Damned If You Do and Damned If You Don’t: The Use of Prime Ministerial Discretion and the Royal Prerogative

• Cladi, Lorenzo ^[1]
  1. [1] Plymouth University

     Plymouth University

     Reino Unido

     
• Localización: Parliamentary affairs: A journal of representative politics, ISSN 0031-2290, Vol. 75, Nº 1, 2022, págs. 174-194
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsaa061
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The royal prerogative is one of the most significant elements of the UK’s government and constitution. During the premiership of Gordon Brown and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition led by David Cameron, there was momentum for a reform of the royal prerogative. During the Conservative premiership of Theresa May, the impetus for reform of the royal prerogative has seemingly diminished. This article analyses how the UK Government has made use of the royal prerogative in terms of deploying the armed forces, making and unmaking international treaties and proroguing Parliament. It asserts that while such powers have not been compromised, the ability of Prime Ministers to use them without parliamentary consent has been subject to greater contestation. This has appeared to rein in the discretion of Prime Ministers. However, this article argues that Prime Ministers’ discretion has in fact become more meaningful as their political capital is invested in decisions concerning prerogative powers.

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