John Rawls’ theory of justice and the role ofreasonableness

• Denis Coitinho ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos

     Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos

     Brasil

     
• Localización: Mutatis Mutandis: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, ISSN-e 0719-4773, Nº. 17, 2021, págs. 39-49
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.69967/07194773.v1i17.336
• Títulos paralelos:
  • La teoria de la justicia de John Rawls y el papel de la razonabilidad
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    En este art ́ıculo quiero mostrar la importancia del concepto de razonabilidad en la teor ́ıa de la justicia comoequidad de John Rawls, as ́ı como explicar el problema de lo concepto de razonabilidad en esta teor ́ıa, a saber,sobre la acusaci ́on de debilidad epistemol ́ogica, excesividad e ineficacia. El punto de partida ser ́a resaltar laexigencia de razonabilidad que se hace para el agente moral y pol ́ıtico en la justicia como equidad. M ́as tarde,identificar ́e algunas cr ́ıticas sobre este concepto. Mostrar ́e la cr ́ıtica hecha por Estlund sobre la insularidaddel concepto de razonabilidad y la necesidad de la verdad para la justificaci ́on, y la cr ́ıtica hecha por Timmonsy Gaus sobre el requisito de razonabilidad como excesivo y tambi ́en como ineficaz. En el siguiente paso,voy a tratar de responder a estas cr ́ıticas y en la parte final del texto intento reflexionar sobre el valor delpluralismo en la teor ́ıa de la justicia como equidad

  • English

    In this paper I want to show the importance of the concept of reasonableness in John Rawls’s theory of justiceas fairness, as well as explain the problem of reasonableness in this theory, namely, about the accusationof epistemological weakness, excessiveness and ineffectiveness. The starting point will be to stress therequirement of reasonableness that is made to the moral and political agent in justice as fairness. Later, I willidentify some criticism about these criteria. I will show the criticism made by Estlund about the insularity ofthe concept of reasonableness and the necessity of truth for justification, and the criticism established byTimmons and Gaus regarding the requirement of reasonableness as excessive and ineffective too. In the nextstep, I shall try to respond to these criticisms, and in the final part of the text I try to reflect on the value ofpluralism within the theory of justice as fairness

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