Acceso usuarios
Gabriel L. Negretto, Mark Ungar
Despus de ms de una dcada de regmenes de transicin democrtica, muchos pases de Amrica Latina todava tienen un sistema judicial que carece de una mnima independencia del poder poltico que le d credibilidad a su funcin. Y no hay que buscar la explicacin a lo anterior en los defectos del diseo institucional evidentes a veces, sino en la falta de incentivos a los actores polticos, para mantener su compromiso de acatar las garantas que protegen la independencia del poder judicial. A partir del estudio de los casos argentino y venezolano, los autores sostienen que dichos incentivos slo pueden darse cuando esos actores resuelven los problemas de cooperacin del pasado que les han impedido crear y reforzar diseos constitucionales estables y autosustentables.
After more than a decade of democratic transitional regimes, many countries in Latn America still have a Judiciary that lacks the mnimum independence from political power in order to give credibility to its function. The explanation to this situation must not be sought so much in the defects of the institutional design -evident at times-, but rather in the lack of incentives offered to political actora stick to their commitment to follow the garanties that protect the independence of Judicial power. Building on Argentine and Venezuela cases, the authors argue that incentives can only be effective when political actora are capable of solving the cooperation problema of the past, which have prevented them from creating and enforcing atable and self-sustained constitutional designs.
