Resumen de Ronald Dworkin’s legal non-positivism: Main characteristics 1and its confrontation with legal positivism of the twentieth century (h.L.A. Hart)

Gabriela Guadalupe Valles Santillán

• español

  Esta nota se basa en el modelo no iuspositivista de Ronald Dworkin, desarrollado por este jurista en importantes obras como lo es Taking rights seriously, Law’s Empire y Freedom’s Law —la lectura moral de la Constitución Americana—. Además, se suma la consulta de la obra en la cual dicho jurista aborda una teoría de la justicia —Justice for Hedgehogs—, así como la referencia a algunos otros autores que complementan el estudio correspondiente, con el fin de confrontar este modelo con el iuspositivismo del siglo XX, en particular con el modelo iuspositivista de H.L.A. Hart. El objetivo principal es mostrar extractos que se consideran significativos del modelo teórico principialista Dworkiniano, con el fin de comprender y distinguir este modelo cognitivo-moral no iuspositivista, con énfasis en los derechos fundamentales y la exposición de la premisa de la única solución correcta o única respuesta a controversias jurídicas sometidas al análisis de los jueces en casos difíciles —los llamados hard cases—.

• English

  This note is based on the legal non-positivist model of Ronald Dworkin, developed in important works such as Taking rights seriously, Law’s Empire, and Freedom’s Law —the moral reading of the American Constitution—. Furthermore, the consultation of the work of this jurist is taken into account, because in it a theory of justice is developed —Justice for Hedgehogs—. This note is complemented with the reference of other authors to confront this model with the legal positivism view of the Twentieth Century, in particular with the positivist legal model of H.L.A. Hart. The main purpose is to show extracts that are considered significant to the theoretical principialist Dworkinian model of law, in order to understand and distinguish this cognitive-moral non-positivist type of model. Therefore, an emphasis on fundamental rights and the exposure of the premise regarding the only correct solution, or the only answer to legal controversies submitted to the analysis of the judges in difficult cases —the so-called hard cases— is taken into account.