The name of God, in the philosophies of Levinas, Marion, and Derrida, comes to question phenomenology itself – whether it interrupts it (Levinas), deconstructs it (Derrida), or accomplishes it (Marion). This article successively studies the philosophies of Levinas, Marion and Derrida, to shed light on their singular treatment of God’s name: his name, rather than his existence, essence, or transcendence. For Levinas, the name of God is the name of the ethical interruption; for Derrida, it is a name for the impossible; for Marion, it is the name of givenness, that is, the name of phenomenology itself. Far from any theistic posture, or any experiential phenomenology of God’s transcendence, the name of God acquires a metatheoretical function, leading to an examination of phenomenology, logos, and subjectivity.