Love, reasons, and replaceability

• Autores: José Antonio Díez Calzada, Andrea Iacona
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 53, Nº. 158, 2021, págs. 3-21
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2021.1268
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Los amantes suelen tener dos tipos de pensamientos sobre sus seresamados. Por un lado, piensan que algunas cualidades de sus amados les dan motivospara amarlos. Por otro lado, consideran irreemplazables a sus seres amados. Sinembargo, cabe preguntarse cómo pueden coexistir coherentemente estos dos tipos depensamientos. Si Romeo ama a Julieta en virtud de su forma de ser, ¿no debería amarigualmente a otra mujer con las mismas cualidades? En este artículo establecemosalgunas distinciones que consideramos cruciales para la comprensión de las razonespara amar. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que, aunque la afirmación de que los seresamados son irreemplazables es plausible, hay al menos un sentido interesante en elque los amados son reemplazables.

  • English

    Lovers typically entertain two sorts of thoughts about their beloveds.On the one hand, they think that the qualities of their beloveds provide reasons forloving them. On the other, they regard their beloveds as irreplaceable. Yet it maybe asked how these two sorts of thoughts can coherently coexist. If Romeo lovesJuliet in virtue of her qualities, shouldn’t another maiden with the same qualities beequally lovable for him? This paper draws some distinctions that are crucial to theunderstanding of reasons for love. Its aim is to show that, even though the claimthat beloveds are irreplaceable is plausible to some extent, there is a sense in whichbeloveds are replaceable.

• Referencias bibliográficas
  • Abramson, A. and K. Leite, 2011, “Love As a Reactive Emotion”, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 245, pp. 673–699.
  • Brogaard, B., 2018, “Romantic Love for a Reason”, in C. Grau and A. Smuts (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love, Oxford University...
  • Delaney, N., 1996, “Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 4, pp....
  • Frankfurt, H., 2004, The Reasons of Love, Princeton University Press, Princenton.
  • Goldie, P., 2010, “Love for a Reason”, Emotion Review, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 61–67.
  • Grau, C., 2010, “Love and History”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 246–271.
  • Grau, C. and C.L.S. Pury, 2013, “Attitudes towards Reference and Replaceability”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 5, no. 2, pp....
  • Helm, B., 2013, “Love”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, descargado de http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/love
  • Jollimore, T., 2017, “Love: The Vision View”, in K. Kroeker and E. Schaubroeck (eds.), Love, Reason and Morality, Routledge, London, pp. 1–19.
  • Jollimore, T., 2011, Love’s Vision, Princeton University Press, Princenton.
  • Keller, S., 2000, “How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Count the Properties”, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 163–173.
  • Kolodny, N., 2003, “Love as Valuing a Relationship”, Philosophical Review, vol. 112, no. 2, pp. 135–189.
  • Kraut, R., 1986, “Love De Re”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 413–430.
  • Lord, E., 2018, The Importance of Being Rational, Oxford University Press, London.
  • Milligan, T., 2013, “The Duplication of Love’s Reasons”, Philosophical Explorations, vol. 16, no. 13, pp. 315–323.
  • Naar, N., 2019, “The Possibility of Fitting Love: Irreplaceability and Selectivity”, Synthese, vol. 198, no. 2, pp. 985–1010.
  • Nozick, R., 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, New York.
  • Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, New York.
  • Protasi, S., 2016, “Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don’t Love You Back)”, European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 1,...
  • Smuts, A., 2014, “Normative Reasons for Love, Part I”, Philosophy Compass, vol. 9, no. 8, pp. 507–517.
  • Solomon, R.C., 2002, “Reasons for Love”, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 1–28.
  • Velleman, J.D., 1999, “Love As a Moral Emotion”, Ethics, vol. 109, no. 2, pp. 338–374.
  • Whiting, J.E., 1991, “Impersonal Friend”, Monist, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 3–29.
  • Williams, B., 2008, “Internal and External Reasons”, in J.E. Adler and L.J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations,...
  • Zangwill, N., 2013, “Love: Gloriously Amoral and Arational”, Philosophical Explorations, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 298–314.