Persistencia institucional y costes de transacción en la política electoral española

• Autores: Gonzalo Caballero Miguez , Ignacio Lago Peñas
• Localización: Papeles de economía española, ISSN 0210-9107, Nº 168, 2021 (Ejemplar dedicado a: La calidad de las instituciones y la economía española), págs. 144-156
• Idioma: español
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen
  • español

    En este artículo se examinan los fundamentos del enfoque institucional en economía y ciencia política, en particular la naturaleza de los costes de transacción en los mercados económico y político. Tras presentar la literatura en economía, explicamos los tipos de costes de transacción existentes en el mercado político-electoral. Con datos agregados e individuales mostramos cómo las reglas electorales y la identificación de partido influyen en la estabilidad del equilibrio en el sistema de partidos en España.

  • English

    In this paper the foundations of the institutional analysis in economics and political science are examined, in particular the transaction costs in the economic and political markets. After discussing the state of the art in economics, the types of transaction costs in the electoral market are explained.

    Relying on aggregate – and individual – level data we show how electoral rules and party identification affect the stability of party system equilibrium in Spain.

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