Acceso usuarios
Isabel Lifante Vidal 
Should the prohibition on the imperative mandate be removed from our current constitutional legal systems (which would not only imply repealing the constitutional provisions in which it is contemplated, but change the own understanding of representative democracy)? The arguments that are argued today in favor of establishing the institution of the imperative mandate have to do, fundamentally, with the safeguarding of the intermediation role that political parties play in the current representative democracies and the challenges that phenomena such as floor crossing or populism represent for this role. Despite this, this article firmly defends the need to continue excluding the imperative mandate from our representative political practices. To successfully tackle any of the problems that affect our democracies, it is necessary to start from a correct understanding of what constitutes the good performance of representative activity in general, and of political representation in particular. This contribution, therefore, addresses this question in some detail. In the author’s opinion, the activity of representation consists of acting in defense of the interests of those who are represented. This activity cannot be reduced, in any field, to mere obedience to the will of those represented, and much less in the sphere of political representation, one of whose presuppositions is precisely the idea that the national will is not something that pre-exists representative activity itself. It is the representatives themselves who must shape this «national will», for which it seems necessary that they can deliberate and negotiate freely among themselves to be able to reach agreements. The prohibition of the imperative mandate thus appears as a necessary (although obviously not sufficient) requirement for parliamentarians to adequately carry out their responsibilities as collegiate representatives
