Sí hay negación lógica

• Autores: Ricardo Arturo Francisco Nicolás, Luis Estrada González
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 52, Nº. 155, 2020, págs. 55-72
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1194
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    En este artículo discutimos la tesis de Jc Beall según la cual no haynegación lógica. Evaluamos la solidez del argumento con el que defiende su tesis y presentamos dos razones para rechazar una de sus premisas: que la negacióntiene que ser excluyente o exhaustiva. La primera razón involucra una presentación alternativa de las reglas de la negación en sistemas de secuentes diferentes al que Beall presupone. La segunda razón establece que la negación no tiene que ser excluyente o exhaustiva

  • English

    In this paper we discuss Jc Beall’s thesis that there is no logical negation.We asses the soundness of Beall’s argument and we put forward two reasons tonegate the truth of one of its premises: that negation has to be whether exclusiveor exhaustive. The first reason involvesan alternative presentation of the rules fornegation in sequent systems different to that presupposed by Beall. The secondreason establishes that negation need not be neither exclusive nor exhaustive.

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