Acceso usuarios
Miguel Ángel Medina Abellán
Los diez sistemas de ríos principales del continente asiático nacen en el Himalaya, la gran mayoría, en la enorme meseta tibetana. China es uno de los países con más ríos transfronterizos en el mundo, solo superado por Rusia y Argentina. La torre de agua de Asia se encuentra en una posición que le confiere un enorme poder e influencia, y las decisiones que adopte en el campo de sus relaciones hidráulicas con el resto de países tiene un alcance regional, continental y, posiblemente, global. La gestión de sus 16 ríos transfronterizos puede afectar la disponibilidad de agua de muchos países río abajo, con afectación directa al acceso a los recursos hídricos de 14 países en el continente asiático y de casi tres billones de personas, es decir casi la mitad de la población mundial El objetivo del presente artículo es analizar el comportamiento hidráulico chino en el complejo del Himalaya, a partir de dos casos de estudio: las relaciones de China con Nepal e India. Se pretende así contribuir al debate sobre, por una parte, los factores explicativos del comportamiento hídrico de la potencia asiática, prestando especial atención a la importancia de la meseta tibetana y, por el otro, al debate académico sobre la estrategia china en relación con uno de los recursos más apreciados del planeta, el agua. China cuenta hoy en día con unas 90.000 infraestructuras hidráulicas, contando presas, diques y proyectos de desvío de agua, y sus intereses hídricos abarcan tanto ríos internos —que acusan la escasez y la sequía con más gravedad, como el Amarillo o el Yangtzé— como los ríos transfronterizos internacionales, lo que conlleva de inmediato una amenaza para los países con los que comparte estos ríos —como el Brahmaputra.
El principal argumento es que la política china en el Himalaya es un eslabón más en el intento chino de consolidar su presencia política y estratégica en diferentes partes del mundo. Las relaciones hídricas chinas se deben analizar en el contexto de la política exterior del gigante asiático en la última década, marcada por su expansionismo, su cristalización como gran potencia mundial, y su estilo de política exterior a escala global El artículo se estructura de la siguiente forma. El primer apartado contiene el marco teórico y analítico del articulado, empezando por el paraguas conceptual que nos ofrece la hidropolítica para entender el comportamiento en términos hídricos de China en el espacio del Himalaya, en base a dos conceptos principales: hidrohegemonía e hidrodominación. El segundo apartado contiene una disección analítica del Himalaya como complejo hídrico y el estudio de los casos relevantes para entender el comportamiento de China en el sistema himalayo; Nepal e India. El análisis de los factores explicativos de la política hídrica china, a nivel endógeno y exógeno, así como la estrategia seguida por Pekín, sustentan el tercer apartado del documento. Las conclusiones y consideraciones finales cierran el presente artículo.
Asia’s ten main river systems originate in the Himalayas, most of them in the enormous Tibetan plateau, the Roof of the World, which holds a unique geostrategic importance in the world and is controlled by China. This is one of the countries with the most trans-boundary rivers in the world, second only to Russia and Argentina. The Asian water tower holds a position that gives it enormous power and influence, and the possible decisions Beijing can make regarding its hydraulic relations with the rest of the countries transcend the Himalayas and have a regional, continental and possibly global scope. The management of its 16 transboundary rivers can affect the availability of water in many downstream countries, directly affecting access to water resources in 14 of them on the Asian continent and almost three billion people, that is, almost half of the world population.
This article aims to analyse Chinese hydraulic behaviour in the Himalayan complex, based on two case studies: Nepal and India. On the one hand, the present piece of work contributes to the debate on the explanatory factors of Chinese water behaviour, both domestically and internationally. On the other, it traces the academic debate on Chinese strategy in relation to one of the most valued resources on the planet, water. China has embarked upon 90,000 projects on hydraulic infrastructure, including dams, dikes, water diversion projects, river basin and river water transfers. These megaprojects affect both internal rivers —which suffer from the most serious scarcity and drought, such as the Yellow river or the Yangtze—, as well as international transboundary rivers, which immediately pose a threat to the countries with which it shares these rivers —such as the Brahmaputra. The Himalayas represent a strategic enclave of extraordinary significance in the international system, but it remains unknown and under studied in Spain, especially the case of Tibet, the Himalayas, and Sino-Indian relations.
The theoretical framework guiding this research comes from hydropolitics, coined for the first time in 1979 by Waterbury and that holds significant explanatory power for the present work. The analysis uses hydropolitics as the systematic investigation of the interaction between riparian states, non-state actors and other participants in relation to the authorized allocation and / or use of national and international water resources. Hydro-politics is also related to the capacity of geopolitical institutions to manage shared water resources in a politically sustainable way. Two main concepts related to hydropolitics frame the research. On the one hand, hydrohegemony, understood as the preponderance position of a country within a given water complex. On the other, that of hydrodomination, highlighting the behaviour of a country trying to impose its dominion. Both concepts are notably intertwined but do not mean, or imply, the same, and both will illuminate the findings of the study of China’ water policy in the Himalayas.
The text is structured as follows. First, it sets out the rationale of the paper, laying out the main objectives, the relevance of the topic under scrutiny and the appropriateness of the selected case studies. The second section bears the theoretical part of the paper and contains two main aspects. First, it depicts water as a geopolitical problem and outlines why water is a geopolitical asset. Second, it explores hydropolitics as the main explanatory approach and the two main concepts therein, hydrohegemony and hydrodomination. The main empirical part of the article is found in the third section, and unfolds by presenting the Himalayas, highlighting its strategic standpoint, namely as a key hydrological complex. It then analyses two meaningful case studies, which help address the two main questions posed by the paper. Sketching out China’s hydropower in Tibet as the main domestic factor, as the Tibetan plateau is the main source of hydrological power to China, the paper focuses on China’s projects in Nepal as the first case under the prism of the study- China is returning and increasingly stepping into this territory through several water-related projects. Then, the paper draws attention to Sino-Indian relations and, concretely, to the relations over the Sikkim region and the Chinese projects in the Brahmaputra.
The summary outlines some findings of the analysis of the case studies. It states that China takes advantage of its hydrohegemony and of the current international context to impose its preferences over water relations and to pursue a unilateral, assertive, aggressive hydropolicy. China’ water context cannot be neglected, but the crisis of multilateralism and lingering geopolitical disputes in the wider Himalayan region are external factors that shape Chinese behaviour. A second finding is related to geography, as geographical considerations always matter. China’s control over the Tibetan plateau and its transboundary water character provide this country with a position which allows this country to exert some hegemony and domination vis-à-vis its riparian neighbours. This is not merely a geographical reality, but a geopolitical imperative that China always uses as a trump card. Third, China’s hydropolicy in Nepal and India seems to indicate a huge degree of continuity in Mao’s the bigger, the better policy. Beijing keeps its political strategy to become the world’s leading superpower, and this needs naturally enormous infrastructure projects, massive investments, and a global quest for natural resources. Some of the concrete projects presented, such as the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, are remarkable in that sense. The final conclusions and considerations close this article. The paper zooms out and refers to the relevance of the Himalayas, with the special case of the Tibetan plateau, to Chinese behaviour and to hydropolitics. It also proposes some topics and theoretical approaches for future research.
The main argument of the article is that Chinese water policy in the Himalayas should be conceived as one more step in China’s attempt to consolidate its political and strategic presence in different parts of the world. Chinese relations must be analyzed in the context of its foreign policy over the last decade, marked by its expansionism, its crystallization as a great world power and the fostering of mega projects and initiatives on a global scale. In short, maybe the most hydropolitical imperative of China is Why should I cooperate if I can dominate?
