Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining with private information

• Autores: Ana C. Mauleón Echeverria, V. J. Vannetelbosch
• Localización: Spanish economic review, ISSN 1435-5469, Vol. 5, Nº 4, 2003, págs. 307-316
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/s10108-003-0069-8
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.

• Referencias bibliográficas
  • Binmore, K.G., Rubinstein, A., Wolinsky, A. (1986) The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling. Rand Journal of Economics 17: 176-188
  • Campbell, C.M. (1993) Do firms pay efficiency wages? Evidence with data at the firm level. Journal of Labor Economics 11: 442-470
  • Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J., Kochan, T.A., Calhoun Wells, J.C. (1998) How do labor and management view collective bargaining? Monthly Labor Review...
  • Diaz-Moreno, C., Galdon-Sanchez, J.E. (2000) Collective bargaining under complete information. Discussion Paper 401, London School of Economics,...
  • Garino, G., Martin, C. (2000) Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining. Economics Letters 69: 181-185
  • Konings, J., Walsh, P. (1994) Evidence of efficiency wage payments in UK firm level panel data. Economic Journal 104: 542-555
  • Layard, R., Nickell, S., Jackman, R. (1991) Unemployment: Macroeconomic performance and the labour market. Oxford University Press, Oxford,...
  • Mauleon, A., Vannetelbosch, V.J. (2003) Market competition and strike activity. International Journal of Industrial Organization 21: 737-758
  • Rubinstein, A. (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50: 97-109
  • Shapiro, C., Stiglitz, J.E. (1984) Equilibrium unemployment as a worker-discipline device. American Economic Review 74: 433-444
  • Summers, L.H. (1988) Relative wages, efficiency wages and Keynesian unemployment. American Economic Review 78: 383-388
  • Watson, J. (1998) Alternating-offer bargaining with two-sided incomplete information. Review of Economic Studies 65: 573-594
  • Yellen, J.L. (1984) Efficiency-wage models of unemployment. American Economic Review 74: 200-205