Sometimes some things don’t (really) exist: Pragmatic meinongism and the referentialsub-problem of negative existentials

• Autores: Lenny Clapp
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 52, Nº. 154, 2020, págs. 100-127
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1176
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Para resolver el sub-problema referencialde los existenciales negativos, uno debe explicar por que interpretamos usos de, por ejemplo, “Sherlock Holmes no existe” como diciendo algo coherente e intuitivamente verdadero, aunque elhablante intenta referirse aalgo. Elmeinongismo pragmáticoresuelve este problemaal permitir que “no existe” seapragmáticamente moduladopara expresar unsentidoinclusivosegún el cual puede ser satisfecho por algo. En este trabajo establezco trespuntos en defensa del meinongismo pragmático: (1) es superior a las solucionesinspiradas por Russell, (ii) es apoyado por evidencia independiente de modulaciónpragmática, y (iii) no requiere compromisos ontológicos dudoso

  • English

    To solve thereferential sub-problemof negative existentials one mustexplain why we interpret uses of,e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ as sayingsomething coherent and intuitively true, even though the speaker purports to refertosomething.Pragmatic Meinongismsolves this problem by allowing ‘does notexist’ to bepragmatically modulatedto express aninclusive senseunder whichit can be satisfied by something. I establish three points in defense of pragmaticMeinongism: (i) it is superior to Russell-inspired solutions; (ii) it is supported byindependent evidence of pragmatic modulation; and (iii) it requires no dubiousontological commitments.

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