Nonexistence and aboutness:The bandersnatches of dubuque

• Autores: Stephen Yablo
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 52, Nº. 154, 2020, págs. 77-100
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1175
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Holmes existees falsa. ¿Cómo puede ser, cuando no hay nadie acercade quien puede ser la oración? Parte de la respuesta es que el tema de la oracióndepende del contexto. Así comoEl rey de Francia es calvo, normalmente imposiblede ser evaluada, es falsa qua descripción de la gente calva,Holmes existees falsaqua descripción de las cosas que existen; describe mal esas cosas como si Holmesestuviera entre ellas. Esto no explica, sin embargo, cómoHolmes no existedifiereen valor cognitivo de, digamos,Vulcano no existe. Nuestra respuesta se construyea partir de una observación de Kripke: aun cuando Holmes exista, no está en estecuarto, porque todos nacimos demasiado tarde

  • English

    Holmes existsis false. How can this be, when there is no one for thesentence to misdescribe? Part of the answer is that a sentence’s topic depends oncontext.The king of France is bald, normally unevaluable, is false qua descriptionof the bald people. LikewiseHolmes existsis false qua description of the thingsthat exist; it misdescribes those things as having Holmes among them. This doesnot explain, though, howHolmes does not existdiffers in cognitive content from,say,Vulcan does not exist. Our answer builds on an observation of Kripke’s: evenif Holmes exists, he is not in this room, for we were all born too late

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