Corporate merger, organizational form, and control of labor

• Autores: María Begoña Garzón San Felipe, Juan Carlos Bárcena Ruiz
• Localización: Spanish economic review, ISSN 1435-5469, Vol. 2, Nº 2, 2000, págs. 129-144
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1007/pl00011437
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • Abstract. This paper shows that, when two firms merge, the increase in the bargaining strength of the multiproduct firm arising from the merger when negotiating uniform wages with the workers is one of the reasons that account for corporate mergers. Moreover, there is a strategic variable that can be used to decrease union rents in the case of merging, namely, the organization of production decisions.