Trade-off effect of pay-as-you-go public pension on economic and welfare volatility

• Insook Lee ^[1]
  1. [1] Peking University

     Peking University

     China

     
• Localización: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, ISSN 0210-1173, Nº 233, 2020, págs. 117-140
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.7866/HPE-RPE.20.2.5
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Utilizando un modelo de generaciones solapadas en el que individuos heterogéneos determinan su consumo y su oferta de trabajo para responder a los shocks en la productividad total de los factores, se constata que el sistema de pensiones de reparto produce un trade off entre la estabilidad macroeconó- mica y la variación en los niveles de bienestar. Este documento demuestra desde un punto de vista teórico que un sistema de pensión pública basado en el reparto puede reducir la volatilidad del consu- mo y del bienestar social a costa del aumento en la volatilidad de la producción agregada, en la oferta de trabajo y en la inversión. Al reducir los efectos de las recesiones en el nivel de renta en la etapa de jubilación, un sistema de pensiones públicas de reparto puede hacer que los individuos trabajen y aho- rren menos en las recesiones y más en la etapa expansiva del ciclo.

  • English

    Using an overlapping-generations model where heterogeneous individuals choose their own consump- tion and labor supply for responding to total factor productivity shocks, this paper finds a trade-off effect of pay-as-you-go public pension on macroeconomic stability and welfare volatility. This paper theoretically proves that pay-as-you-go public pension can reduce volatilities of total consumption and social welfare at the cost of increasing volatilities of aggregate output, labor supply, and investment. By reducing the exposure of retirement wealth to aggregate shocks, pay-as-you-go public pension can make individuals work and save less in recessions and more in booms.

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