Frock Coats against Brass Hats?: Politicians, the Military and the War in Afghanistan 2001–2014

• Dixon, Paul ^[1]
  1. [1] Department of Politics, School of Social Sciences, Malet Street, Bloomsbury, London, WC1 7HX, UK
• Localización: Parliamentary affairs: A journal of representative politics, ISSN 0031-2290, Vol. 73, Nº 3, 2020, págs. 651-691
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsz015
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The ‘Dominant Military Narrative’ (DMN) on the Iraq and Afghan wars defends the effectiveness of the British military and its use of force by deflecting responsibility for failure onto the politicians and ‘Whitehall’. The politicians are blamed for over-stretching the military by fighting two wars, resulting in a shortage of equipment, inadequate troop numbers and without a clear ‘Strategic Narrative’. This article critiques the DMN and provides evidence to suggest that it was the military elite that sought maximum involvement in the Iraq and Afghan wars. The problem is that the military has too much rather than too little power to shape policy.

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