Insolvency judges meet strategic behaviour: A comparative empirical study

• Gijs van Dijck ^[1] ; Ruben Hollemans ^[1] ; Monika Maśnicka ^[2] ; Catarina Frade ^[3] ; Lorenzo Benedetti ^[4] ; Lucilla Galanti ^[4] ; Paula Fernando ^[3] ; Joanna Kruczalak Jankowska ^[2] ; Niccolo Abriani ^[4] ; Ruben Jesus ^[3] ; Anna Machnikowska ^[2] ; Ilaria Pagni ^[4]
  1. [1] Maastricht University

     Maastricht University

     Países Bajos

     
  2. [2] University of Gdańsk

     University of Gdańsk

     Gdańsk, Polonia

     
  3. [3] Universidade de Coimbra

     Universidade de Coimbra

     Coimbra (Sé Nova), Portugal

     
  4. [4] University of Florence

     University of Florence

     Firenze, Italia

     

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• Localización: Maastricht journal of European and comparative law, ISSN 1023-263X, Vol. 27, Nº. 2, 2020, págs. 158-177
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1177/1023263X20906669
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• Resumen

  • This article reports the results of a comparative empirical legal study that analyzed (1) strategic behaviour by actors in insolvencies that is salient to insolvency judges and (2) how insolvency judges respond to such behaviour. After examining four different European countries, namely Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal, the study reveals how differences regarding case allocation, judge – insolvency practitioner (IP) interaction, and remuneration and case financing can result in strategic behaviour on both the side of the judges and the IPs. From this, it follows that improving the efficiency and effectiveness is not merely a matter of implementing legislation and case law, but that it also requires a look into the dynamics between insolvency judges, IPs, and other actors in the insolvency process.