¿Qué es un contexto para las teorías cognitivas del razonamiento?

• JONATAN GARCÍA CAMPOS ^[1] ; SAÚL SARABIA LÓPEZ ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango

     Universidad Juárez del Estado de Durango

     México

     
  2. [2] Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

     Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

     México

     
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 51, Nº. 151, 2019, págs. 85-115
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.04
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    El artículo tiene como propósito analizar la noción de contexto en algunas de las teorías más importantes en la psicología cognitiva. Argumentaremos que la noción de contexto puede hacer referencia a al menos cinco ideas: la familiaridad del contenido, el formato del problema, la perspectiva del sujeto, la estructura lógica distinta y el ambiente. Indagaremos las relaciones posibles entre dichas nociones de contexto y esbozaremos respuestas a dos preguntas que pueden plantearse al análisis presentado, esto es, cuál es la razón por la que se tienen diferentes nociones de contexto en la psicología cognitiva, y cuál podría ser la consecuencia en los debates sobre razonamiento y racionalidad si se distinguen distintas nociones de contexto.

  • English

    The purpose of this article is to analyze the notion of context in some of the most important theories of cognitive psychology. We shall argue that the notion of context can make reference to at least five different ideas: familiarity of the content, problem format, subject’s perspective, different logical structure, and environment. We shall investigate what relationships between the notions of context might be, and we shall draw to an answer two questions that can be raised to our analysis, i.e., why there are different notions of context in cognitive psychology, and what the consequences would be to reasoning and rationality debates if we distinguish different notions of context

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