Multiple indexing relativism about predicates of taste

• Dan Zeman ^[1]
  1. [1] Vienna University of Technology

     Vienna University of Technology

     Innere Stadt, Austria

     
• Localización: Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía, ISSN 0011-1503, Vol. 51, Nº. 151, 2019, págs. 5-34
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.01
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Relativismo de múltiples índices sobre predicados de gusto
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen
  • español

    Centrando la atención en los predicados de gusto, este artículo propone una nueva versión de relativismo, cuya motivación es un fenómeno que se ha discutido recientemente: la pluralidad de perspectivas. Tras mostrar que este fenómeno es problemático para algunas versiones de relativismo y discutir posibles respuestas que el relativista podría ofrecer, presento mi propia versión. La principal característica de la propuesta es la introducción en el índice, no de un único parámetro para perspectivas, sino de una secuencia (posiblemente infinita) de tales parámetros. En la última sección del artículo defiendo esta propuesta de tres objeciones.

  • English

    Focusing on predicates of taste, this paper puts forward a novel version of relativism, motivated by a recently discussed phenomenon: perspectival plurality.

    After showing that the phenomenon is problematic for at least some versions of relativism and discussing several possible answers on behalf of the relativist, I put forward my own version. The main feature of the proposal is the introduction in the index not of a single parameter for perspectives, but of a (possibly infinite) sequence of such parameters. In the last part of the paper, I defend the view against three objections.

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