Acceso usuarios
Sofia Beatriz Calvente
Nos proponemos abordar dos aspectos poco estudiados de la contribuci´on de Alfred Ayer a la comprensi´on de la filosof´ıa de Hume: su consideraci´on acerca del car´acter inferencial de la percepci´on y su propuesta de que la experiencia tiene car´acter p´ublico. En primer lugar, analizaremos c´omo se ha entendido la concepci´on humeana de la experiencia. Sostendremos que la interpretaci´on de Ayer contribuye a modificar la concepci´on privada y atomista de experiencia que usualmente se le atribuye a Hume, al afirmar que para reconocer un objeto no basta un acto simple de percepci´on, sino su vinculaci´on con un entramado de percepciones pasadas. En segundo lugar, analizaremos si el car´acter mental de las percepciones implica que su acceso se da ´unicamente mediante la introspecci´on o si el propio Hume contempla la posibilidad de que puedan comunicarse. Ayer propone que es posible atribuirle un car´acter p´ublico a las percepciones ya que las comprende como una serie de patrones sensoriales que no tienen rasgos de pertenencia personal pero pueden singularizarse a partir de su ocurrencia en un momento y lugar determinados. Esta interpretaci´on da pie a su teor´ıa del “mundo del sentido com´un,” que va m´as all´a de lo que Hume propone pero no resulta contradictoria con los principales postulados de su filosof´ıa.
I propose to address two under-examined aspects of Alferd Ayer’s contribution to the understanding of Hume’s philosophy: his consideration of the inferential nature of perception and his proposal that experience has a public status. First, I will analyze how the Humean conception of experience has been understood. I will argue that Ayer’s interpretation contributes to modifying the private and atomistic conception of experience that is usually attributed to Hume, by stating that in order to recognize an object, a simple act of perception is not enough, but it is required to establish a connection with a network of past perceptions. Secondly, I will analyze whether the mental nature of perceptions implies that their access is given only through introspection or if Hume himself contemplates the possibility that they can be communicated. Ayer argues that it is possible to attribute a public character to perceptions since he understands them as a series of sensory patterns that do not have traces of personal belonging but can be singled out from their occurrence at a specific time and place. This interpretation gives rise to his theory of the ”world of common sense,” which goes beyond what Hume proposes but is not contradictory to the main postulates of his philosophy.
