Does the tax administration play an unfair gamble with taxpayers? Evidence from survey data

• JOSÉ Mª DURÁN-CABRÉ ^[1] ; ALEJANDRO ESTELLER-MORÉ ^[1] ; LUCA SALVADORI ^[2]
  1. [1] Universitat de Barcelona

     Universitat de Barcelona

     Barcelona, España

     
  2. [2] Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

     Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

     Barcelona, España

     
• Localización: Papeles de trabajo del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Serie economía, ISSN 1578-0252, Nº 6, 2018, págs. 1-38
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper we investigate the impact of the economic cycle on tax enforcement. With this aim, we sketch a theoretical model based on ANDREONI (1992) to raise our main hypotheses: the presence of financial constraints faced by taxpayers can play a crucial role in defining the optimal tax enforcement response to an economic shock. In particular, in absence of severe financial constraints, tax administration finds it optimal to set tax enforcement in a counter-cyclical way, while when taxpayers face a severe financial downturn, pro-cyclicity cannot be ruled-out. We test these hypotheses by means of ordered response models applied to Spanish survey data and find results that are coherent with theory. Tax enforcement, as it is perceived by individuals, presents a prevailing countercyclical trend, but in presence of severe economic crisis turns out to be pro-cyclical.