The European Union, on the one hand, and Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, are committed to concluding high-quality, deep free trade agreements (FTAs) as between themselves. On the part of the EU, the ratification of economic integration agreements is complicated because of the involvement of the Member States with their own constitutional requirements. The European Commission, therefore, seeks to fast-track the conclusion of FTAs with these two countries by designing the agreements in a way that would not require the approval of the Member States. Drawing a comparison to the FTA with Japan (JEEPA), the present article seeks to analyse what triggers the need for Member States’ approval, and explicates what changes negotiators would need to make in relation to an EU–Australia/New Zealand FTA. In particular, could such an agreement have chapters on “trade and” topics in the style of JEEPA without making ratification by the Member States a requirement?