Experiencia perceptual, vaguedad y realismo ingenuo

• Amado, Manuel Alejandro ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano

     Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano

     Colombia

     
• Localización: Ideas y valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía, ISSN-e 0120-0062, Vol. 67, Nº. Extra 4, 2018 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Lenguaje, mente y cognición), págs. 149-164
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.15446/ideasyvalores.v67n4Supl.73374
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Perceptual Experience, Vagueness, and Naive Realism
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    Filósofos modernos como Berkeley y Hume desplegaron una argumentación de corte escéptico en contra del llamado realismo ingenuo: la idea de que la experiencia perceptual provee un accesodirecto al mundo. Dicha argumentación ha sido criticada por Michael Martin y John Campbell, quienes reclaman justicia por una nueva forma de realismo ingenuo llamado relacionalista. Se argumenta que tanto el realismo ingenuo como el relacionalista son falsos, y se defiende la tesis central de Berkeley y Hume: no hay experiencias perfectamente verídicas de objetos materiales. 

  • English

    Modern philosophers like Berkeley and Hume deployed skeptical arguments against so-called naive realism: the idea that perceptual experience provides direct access to the world. Michael Martin and John Campbell critique those arguments and champion a new form of naive realism known as relationalism. The article argues that both naive and relational realism are false and defends the main thesis set forth by Berkeley and Hume: there are no perfectly true experiences of material objects.

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